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Satire is a persistent irritant to all who wish to establish a unified theory,
or to write a history over the long duration. The word itself is notoriously
slippery, raising questions of whether it is definable in terms of a core fea-
ture, or a related syndrome of characteristics. Surveying the wealth of
materials deemed satiric might even lead to the conclusion that the noun
has come to refer to no more than a historically contingent family resem-
blance of discursive phenomena, corresponding to no coherent or singular
creative activity. Yet most people, even without the dubious aid of defini-
tions, appear to be able to recognize a piece of satire when they read or
see it. With English satire, there is even fair measure of agreement as to
who the major satirists have been.
Perhaps the problem, then, is less about arriving at a definition than of
knowing how and where to apply one. Nevertheless, to conclude that the
category is useful only in limited contexts of time, place and activity, and
thus is amenable to no single history or theory, may indeed be conceptu-
ally rigorous, but does not easily explain the fact of recognition. So, the
conceptual itch to find a theoretical solution to a troublesome identity
remains. Such imponderables are important and may justify a rather
lengthy assessment of a slim tome devoted to them.
Agudo’s book is divided into three main chapters. The first surveys
the history of satire from its putative beginnings as invective in ancient
Arabic history, Esquimeaux culture and archaic Greece. From there it
focuses on Rome before concentrating mainly on England, rather than
the range of satire found in the English language as a whole. It ends
with the twenty-first century. In the second chapter Agudo catalogues
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a range of disparate theories purporting to define the nature and func-
tions of satire and its principle subjects, which are taken to be religion,
politics and social mores. The third chapter outlines what are described
as satire’s principal rhetorical strategies: irony, parody, wit, detachment
and fantasy, embracing the use of animal imagery, the creation of
Utopian and dystopian visions, and the reliance on scatalogical sym-
bolism. These, it is claimed, render literary satire always indirect and so
di¤erent from the invective in which it originated. There follows a short
conclusion and a bibliography. There is no index and no information
about the author. From the outset, it is stressed that satire, and even just
English satire is complex, shifting and resistant to generalizations. But the
determination both to survey its history (singular) and to provide an over-
arching theory of its nature requires trading in a disembodied abstraction.
The result is highly problematic, but at one with much in the whole field
of study.
The author is suitably modest about what he might achieve in the
chapter devoted to history, based on subjective criteria that seem kept dis-
creetly to himself (44). He has, however, read enough for a scissors and
paste survey derived from the works of literary scholars. Perhaps this is
why the category of literature is projected into distant times in which,
strictly speaking, it was absent. There is, however, no mention of poetics,
in terms of which so much of what we see as satirical was explicitly con-
structed. That satire is principally a literary phenomenon is supported by
citing satirists since deemed to be of literary merit. E¤ectively, then, liter-
ature is reduced to established literature. Those ‘‘whose talent was practi-
cally non-existent’’ (17) are so erased that we are left to guess who they
might have been. Such circularity and systemic anachronism may be an
appropriate preliminary to the question of what, if anything, an array of
largely canonic writers have in common, but it hardly amounts to an his-
torical approach to anything.
Agudo’s treatment of the indirections of satire in the face of censorship
will help flesh out the point. He relies on what literary scholars, rather
than historians, hold to be true about satire and censorship. But this dis-
torts a complex and shifting relationship, as some literary scholars have
recognized. Censorship in England, even when it was o‰cially in force
was erratic and not uniformly e¤ective beyond the theatre; it might ex-
clude imported books and English ones with a falsely foreign provenance
that had little impact on manuscript production. That satirists in the
seventeenth century purported to fear for the consequences of their out-
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spokenness, may have been as much a way of proclaiming their moral
integrity as of insinuating the corruption of authorities too cowardly
to recognize corrective truths. The evocation of danger could be in order
to don the mantle of the prophet alone in his own land. We don’t have to
believe them, but Agudo does: satirists should be, and the best apparently
are, objective and without bias (65)—presumably like Swift, Dryden or
Pope. So, if they say that they fear being silenced by censorious and op-
pressive authority, their writings are clearly good deeds in a naughty
world. Nothing of the nuances of presentation and background circum-
stances so ingeniously exploited by satirists comes through in this study,
and only a hint or two, (with respect to religion) of the changing patterns
of satiric taboos and of what might be called self-censorship.
It is of course true that, for example, resorting to the indirection of al-
legory and beast fable could be a protective mechanism for those who
feared retribution; Margaret Rose has argued that this was the case for
writers and artists during the Third Reich.1 Irrespective of any genuine
expectation of persecution however, the encoding of satire through ani-
mal symbolism constituted a well-established habit going back to Aesop.
So, when Orwell came to write Animal Farm, he was consciously working
in such evocative narrative idioms. His use of animal imagery may have
been a commentary on the self-censorship required among the orthodox
left of British politics. Concomitantly, turning the form of a children’s
farm-yard story to didactic and ideological use may also have been found
o¤ensive by those to whom it was directed; but the assertion that he was
obliged to hide his doctrines in allegory for fear of governmental persecu-
tion is altogether too simple (38–39, 66). The upshot here is that a
mooted historical change, from satire thriving in an oppressive society,
to being diminished in a free one, gains a spurious whi¤ of paradox by a
series of oversimplifications.2 Oppressive or persecuting versus free
ignores social as opposed to state control, and also the fact that modern
states are full of legal restrictions on freedom of expression and are far
more e‰cient in controlling it through the law (there was no police force
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). And indeed what does thriv-
ing satire amount to? I think it means that we can count more writers that
literary critics now take seriously. The whole issue, as presented, is histor-
ically incoherent and innocent.
The grasp on temporal sequence is also at times insecure. Writers living
over a two hundred year period are treated as being contemporaries—
a casual attitude occasionally made worse by poor syntax that inverts
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chronological order (14, 69). Such slips are di‰cult to explain. But the
lack of any ‘o‰cial document’ attesting to contact between Dryden and
Johnson (18) is more easily understood. Johnson was born nine years
after Dryden died; there is no o‰cial documentation of his attending
se´ances.
The preparatory historical survey never considers whether historical
and theoretical approaches can be married comfortably with each other.
The clearest connection lies in the prefiguration of a certain conceptual
indeterminacy. Although the work is on English satire, its origins are
traced to the Arabs and Esquimeaux, for there is a haunting uncertainty
as to whether satire began with, or is itself a literary form of invective. At
the end of the work, I remained none the wiser.
It is, however, entirely fitting that Roman satire be included, because of
the importance of Horace and Juvenal as models for English satirists; but
we are given little more than the familiar contrast between Horatian sub-
tlety and Juvenalian vitriol. Lucilius (c. 180–100), friend and satiric agent
of Scipio Africanus, has his name dropped, as if in a vacuum, twice; but
there is no mention of Lucian whose absence from a survey of English
satire seems more than a little odd. The seminal importance of More’s
Utopia is stressed, but there is not a word on its avowedly Lucianic char-
acter. From More onwards the trajectory is familiar: the heyday of En-
glish satire is the eighteenth century and it declines during the nineteenth
century. I am uncertain whether this means that nineteenth century satire
was not written, or, that little of it is now not read. The history peters out
with a list of English names and the synoptic citation of texts. It would be
carping to dwell on the obvious gaps and as the study is about literature,
it is understandable that there is nothing on film. Yet quite a few ‘‘liter-
ary’’ satirists have been journalists, so their exclusion is less satisfactory.
The vibrant English theatre is largely overlooked. The Americans are
mainly o¤ stage.
The problems of identifying satire, as opposed to listing those already
accepted as e¤ective satirists, are exacerbated by the author slipping be-
tween di¤erent designations of what he is actually writing a history of.
Occasionally satire is a mood or a register and once by implication a
genre (18), mostly it is a mode understood as a sub-genre; but under
what category the sub-genre is subsumed, is unclear (unless, unhelpfully,
literary satire is simply a sub-genre of literature). Satire itself is not,
Agudo concludes, a genre, though in this context of argument, he also
quotes with approval those who say it is. His points of contrast are pro-
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vided by the genres of comedy, epic and tragedy, each having fixed ‘‘pa-
rameters that literary works always follow’’ (47). Really?
The one thing of which the author does seem confident is that satire is,
or was, a moralistic correction to a corrupt reality. This relies upon a sim-
plistic dichotomy between literature and the ‘‘reality’’ it putatively re-
flects. There is, in principle, an obvious artificiality in positing a reality
separate from how people wrote about it and within the world they
understood and then acted in the light of their understandings. In prac-
tice, the bifurcation can make nothing for example of Robert Harley,
Queen Anne’s chief (or prime) minister, employing satirists and using
satire to gain support for his policies. Harley was a member of the most
remarkable satiric grouping of the age, the Scriblerus club and for him,
satire was a way of political conduct. Margaret Thatcher incidentally
exhibited something of Harley’s sensitivity to satire as propaganda, in as-
sociating herself so strongly with the Yes Minister television series which
supplemented her drive to reform the public service. She even appeared
briefly in a specially written stage sketch by its authors, Jonathan Lynn
and Anthony Jay.
The di‰culties in Agudo’s attempted historical survey are compounded
by his acceptance of a dubious generalization from Leonard Feinberg,
namely that modern satire has abandoned the high moral ground to con-
centrate more on technique (Feinberg 1967: 33). This does not sit well
with Agudo’s cautious moves towards a definition. ‘‘Censoring evil or
pettiness seems, therefore, satire’s primary objective’’ (58). There may be
a confusion here between what literary scholars concentrate upon in the
analysis of satire; what satirists, good, bad or indi¤erent, actually do in a
much wider range of activity than was possible in the past; and how casu-
ally the word satire is used in the mass media.
But there are further problems with any thesis of a change so dramatic
it must alter any definition of satire towards which Agudo is moving.
That satirists in, say, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries used much
the same general moral vocabulary to castigate vice and to applaud (usu-
ally absent) virtue, does not entitle us to infer that they appealed to the
same moral standards, or that there was a universal deontology that has
since broken down, certainly a common over-simplification of earlier pat-
terns of moral discourse. What these satirists each might mean by the
‘‘public interest,’’ ‘‘justice,’’ ‘‘hypocrisy’’ and so forth could be very di¤er-
ent. Again, it is less a matter of finding a definition than understanding
the disparate processes of its application: compare for example Marvell
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and Dryden. Both wrote in what they claimed was the public interest and
to excoriate corruption, but had diametrically opposed views as to whom
such critique applied. Marvell, perhaps the most controversial and emu-
lated of seventeenth-century English satirists, is unmentioned throughout
the book; but his views of the Earl of Shaftsbury and his allies are poles
apart from the Satanic image of corruption and treachery crafted by Dry-
den (also, as it happens, during the seventeenth century). Dryden’s is a di-
abolical image, hardly captured by referring to his ‘‘ironising about’’
Shaftsbury’s ‘‘incompetence’’ (18). Yet the moralistic tone of his satire,
no less impassioned than the satires of Marvell, should surely stand as a
corrective against the sort of generalizations concerning satire, morality
and reality so naively presented here. Similarly, modern satirists might
not have abandoned moral standards, or any appeal to them, simply be-
cause nowadays we are attuned to a diversity of ethical norms, or even
because in writing or performing for a given specific audience, the sati-
rist’s appeal to morality can be implicit. Indeed, considering how modern
English satire has become a mainstream form of mass entertainment,
there is a case for arguing that, although there has been a shift of empha-
sis from lecturing to generating amusement, it still reinforces the nos-
trums of everyday morality (whatever these might mean in practice).
Curiously, the very perplexities of defining and categorizing satire, so
rightly emphasized by the author, o¤ered him an opportunity to avoid
serving up tendentious generalities (such as the one to which I have just
succumbed). But plausible dishes are temptations not to be resisted in
the study of satire, and the extensive reading incorporated into this work
gives ample scope for them. Agudo does occasionally show a critical but
always courteous independence, demurring, for example at Northrop
Frye’s argument that satire is no more than a mood or dimension that
might be found in any writing. This is held to be too ‘reductive’, although
no reasons are given (49). For the most part, however, Agudo is deter-
mined to agree with as many theorists as possible (58). For one who
readily accepts that the domain of satire studies is full of confusion, a de-
termination to blend as many perspectives as possible does not bode well
(58).
I suspect such dogged ecumenism arises from a laudable desire to avoid
any unseemly polemic, but the consequence is a disconcerting jangle of
a‰rmations, We are told that all satire is conservative, and then that it
thrives when attacked by the status quo. To reconcile these conflicting po-
sitions, the status quo has to be something other than conservative, and
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conservatism is in fact mistaken for nostalgia (73). But to see all satire as
nostalgic would demand that Agudo discount his own assessment of
More’s Utopia (100). Similarly, humor is said to be a defining feature of
satire, but this is held to be true only sometimes— think of Juvenal, or
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-four (57), as well he might. We might also think
of the seventeenth-century notion of comic satire, something which pre-
supposed forms of satire to one side of any humor.
It is also confusing to be told first that religious and political satire are
very di¤erent, and then that they can be the same (71). Satirists, Agudo
asserts, never deal openly with political and economic realities (65). If all
satire is indirect, this sweeping assessment might be rescued by its own
triviality; but, as I have indicated, satire is treated throughout this book
as a pretty transparent guide to reality and social decline. Indeed, Agudo
is unequivocal, the satire of political systems and personalities is based
‘‘on measurable, tangible realities’’ (67), unlike the satire of religion in-
volving faith. Almost immediately, however, we are told that the satire
of religion is restricted to clerical abuse, something usually regarded by
castigating satirists as pretty tangible, not to say political. The satire of
religion was indeed largely an expression of pious and outraged anti-
clericalism up to and including most of the eighteenth century; but this is
probably less true of religious satire following the French Revolution.
While some of these dissonances could no doubt be harmonized, it would
be only a little unfair to say that, like the satiric invention Cornelius Scri-
blerus who achieved a satisfactory coherence in his beliefs by accepting
the last ancient authority he had read on any subject, Agudo seems to
side with each satiric theorist in turn. He is thus likely to be half right,
for much of the literature, some of the time.
But not always: at one point he cites with approval a statement car-
rying the burden of self-contradiction in its own lumpen English prose
(48). ‘‘Satire’s own frequent formlessness forces it to inhabit the forms
of other genres and makes satire resistant to simplistic versions of a for-
malistic approach’’ (Coombe and Connery 1995: 5). First reify a coher-
ent phenomenon, then attribute agency to its non-existence to explain
its independent operation in the world as a usually formless genre. It
could work, if you believe in genies as well as genres. And then end with
a virtual tautology—of course what is simplistic is going to be inad-
equate, that is what simplistic means. With the guidance of such lumi-
naries, we must necessarily approach the final chapter still in want of a
candle.
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Chapter Three argues that a certain range of rhetorical strategies cre-
ates literary satire, sustaining its ‘‘indispensable premise: indirection’’
(92). Might not this premise, if that is the right term, just be a function
of the strategies chosen? Notwithstanding this possibility, an accepted
asymmetry between the (defining?) strategies and satire itself muddies
the waters. Some of satire’s strategies turn out to be acknowledged as
‘‘not even satiric at all’’ (79). Thus parody might only partly be satiric
(92), or decidedly not satiric (88); I am unsure how this helps clarify
anything.
Once again, uncritical reliance on a theoretical generalization proves
unfortunate. Agudo follows Joseph Dane in seeing satire as about things,
parody about words (Dane 1980: 88). How neat. Yet if true, it threatens
to render irrelevant all previous talk of satirists following the textual
models of writers like Juvenal and Horace. A more significant matter
is, how it might apply to the satire of science and philosophy (pre-
occupations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that pass all but
unnoticed). Some of Swift’s more famous satire (or should that be par-
ody?) gets its power precisely by pretending that words are things. Nor
is it considered that much political satire (from e.g. Arbuthnot of the
‘‘so-called Scriblerus group’’ ([sic] 20) to Orwell) focuses on words. The
satire of politics has frequently been about alleged linguistic perversion
and its power to distort perception.
The notion of a satiric strategy is moreover arbitrary and miscellane-
ous. Clearly, irony is not the same sort of thing as fantasy or a dystopian
vision. Detachment is less a strategy than an end result, or an interpreta-
tive conclusion from the analysis of discursive strategies. But each of
these is just listed and briefly discussed. At this point of the argument, sat-
ire is said to be a ‘‘rhetorical discipline’’ (79), if ‘‘discipline’’ is the right
word; but if so, there is no treatment of rhetoric in any precise sense. Of
the strategies discussed, irony is certainly an established trope. Yet, it
needed distinguishing from sarcasmus, and supplementing with at least
some discussion of conceptions such as subdistinctio, aposiopesis, litotes,
and tapinosis. This last does get some oblique notice, though no real men-
tion, in the comments on animal imagery; but all of them are surely vital
to address if the desired association of satire with indirection is to be sus-
tained. Again, there is a reasonable case to be made here, if there were
any clear attempt to disentangle indirection from generality, or from am-
biguity and equivocation, or to consider the distinction between locution
and illocution. Setting all this aside, to see someone like the author of The
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Julius Exclusus in the sixteenth century, or P. J. O’Rourke and Auberon
Waugh in the twentieth as ‘‘indirect,’’ is a little like calling a glancing
blow from a tank a near miss.
Finally, throughout the book, the English proves inadequate to the
tasks at hand. It could so easily have been brought up to an acceptable
standard, for, despite the awkward syntax, grammatical error and misuse
of vocabulary (all evident on most pages), the gist of the argument is
pretty clear. A book this commendably short, however, has no business
being seduced by verbosity and repetition (e.g. 14, 15, 36, 50, 73), most
of which could also easily have been swept out of the way with a modi-
cum of help. The publishers have done themselves and their author a
grave disservice in not providing a copy editor and (presumably) by in-
sisting on camera-ready copy. The Latin is almost always correct, but
the Spanish invariably remains untranslated. The Battle Between the
Frogs and Mice (1717), cited as anonymous (49), was by Thomas Parnell,
another Scriblerian; the Virgil Travestie was possibly not by Paul Scarron
(89), but by Charles Cotton, or even a Mr. Smith, depending on which
text is actually being referred to (we are never told). For reasons that
should now be evident enough, this is not a book to be recommended to
students but one cannot anticipate just what might be of value to those
engaged in research on satire; even error can prove a fruitful stimulus
and the bibliography as a whole is of considerable value.
Where then, does this brave encapsulation of confusion leave us, or
rather, how may this cautionary tale help to re-direct the study of satire?
First, I think it would be helpful if there were to be some move away
from seeing satire as a literary phenomenon. This view implicitly contex-
tualizes all satire in terms of a quite modern, even a recent, institutional-
ized activity which then becomes historically distorting for vast tracts of
relevant time. Agudo certainly recognizes the presence of satire beyond
literature and although such a shift would not necessarily discount the
insights and analyses of many literary theorists, it would rid the study
of many encumbering presuppositions. It would make it easier to avoid
conflating satire with good literature, which produces the consequent
chaos of confounding critical with historical criteria of judgment. It
should also increase sensitivity to the dangers of regarding the works of
such paradigmatic names as Swift, Pope and Dryden as sound bases for
generalization.
Secondly, it would be instructive to extend the range of what we think
it is that satirists satirize in two ways. On the one hand, we should not
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assume that to call something political satire is necessarily very informa-
tive. Like satire, the political is an unstable notion and it may not be uni-
formly helpful to rely upon it across time and cultures. On the other, the
degree to which study of the satire of philosophy and science has been
ignored is striking;3 yet satirizing metaphysics, logic, natural philosophy,
could be an idiom of critical engagement in all those fields of enquiry,
rather than mere literary descants or reflections upon them. The study of
Thomas Hobbes (another satirist absent from this study), and the satiric
treatment of his work, or the reception of Locke’s Essay on Human Un-
derstanding, provide ample evidence of the importance of widening our
purview.
That satire can be an idiom, a way of doing something else, leads us in
a more positive way back to Agudo’s helpful proposition that under-
standing satire requires a rhetorical context. It is not that satire is any-
thing as neat as the expression ‘‘rhetorical discipline’’ would imply, but
insofar as humor is tied to satire—and it usually is— lines of enquiry
are already established. The provocation of laughter may be crucial to
the processes of persuasion, by isolating and ridiculing a victim, by pro-
tecting the victimizer, and in maintaining a sense of social solidarity and
belonging. Rhetorical theorists have surely known this since antiquity and
the early modern world, educated in rhetoric and poetics not literature,
never lost sight of it. Perhaps in the end we don’t need a theory or a def-
inition, although these may be useful in the class-room; but to research
the phenomenon, we need to look and see at least how, when, where and
in what sort of immediate linguistic context the word satire and its cog-
nates was used. If I may hazard a vulnerable generalization about the
study of satire as a whole, it still remains uncomfortably poised between
how satiric expression might cast light on other times and on other social
and intellectual worlds, and how it might fit with modern institutionalized
and disciplinary expectations. In a word, we need to rely less on an ab-
stract noun, than on the wayward variety of the adjectival form. Such a
shift back towards Northrop Frye’s insights might not be reductive, as
Agudo states, but liberating.
University of New South Wales CONAL CONDREN
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Notes
Correspondence address: conalcondren@optusnet.com.au
1. Margaret Rose, Parody/Meta-Fiction, (London: Croom Helm, 1979). This book is in
the bibliography, but seems to have been unused, as is her later much expanded version
of the work.
2. In this line of argument, Agudo largely follows Dustin Gri‰n, Satire: A Critical Re-
introduction, (Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1994).
3. For two noteworthy examples see Joseph M. Levine, Dr Woodward’s Shield: History,
Science, and Satire in Augustan England, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977);
and Christopher Fox, Locke and the Scriblerians: Identity and Consciousness in Early
Eighteenth-Century Britain, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
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